by Ray Dunkle
In 1916 the Kaiser Wilhelm II found a good idea to destabilise the eastern front - to send Vladimir Ilich Ulianov back to Russia. This man became world known as Lenin and the rest is history. A foreign intervention of this kind that triggered the riots and the uprisings cannot be excluded yet the main issue is that the participation has been a massive underlying aspect at deep levels of political and social dissatisfactions. In this article I'll examine some parameters that are influencing the situation in the Northern Africa countries which are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Morocco is a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament, Algeria is a presidential republic, and in reality Tunisia had an authoritarian state, same as Libya and Egypt. Though all of them have been clinging to authoritarian regimes the crisis is not a regimental one per se. The rising of the food prices, the economical crisis, and the corruption, the high direct and indirect taxation, the urbanisation around the coastal areas, the directed privatisations, the anomalies in domestic and foreign investments, the lack of infrastructures and the unemployment were the significant reasons for the revolts.
I will also briefly mention three major treaties that influenced and fuelled the uprisings as they will show the intra-Arab and the EU-Arab relationships.
The first is the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) signed by Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritania. The AMU aimed to safeguard the region's economic interests, foster and promote economic and cultural co-operation, and intensify mutual commercial exchanges as a precursor for integration and the creation of a North African Common Market (also referred to as Maghreb Economic Space). Common defence and non-interference in the domestic affairs of the partners are also key aspects of the AMU Treaty. A common front against the Saharan guerrilla movements was an essential part of the treaty. The AMU is currently halted for political reasons (mainly the territorial dispute between Algeria and Morocco for the Western Africa). Also, the stalemate was an economical one as well; due to the similarity of the goods produced and export structures in these countries the intra-AMU trade was extremely low. (1)
The second is the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) that came into existence in 1997 and in the beginning was signed by Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. It expanded to include Jordan, Yemen, and the Palestinian Authority. It should be noticed that Algeria signed in 2002 as well and entered the GAFTA in 2009 and became its 18th member. Its aims have been mainly the reduction of tariffs, the removal of trade barriers (in almost all sectors even though there exists a transition period. It permanently excludes trade related to religious, sanitary, environmental and security reasons, it also excludes temporarily some goods which cannot account for more than 15% of each country's total imports from other GAFTA countries but from 2002 and on the latter were lifted), the exchange of goods, the avoidance of a double taxation and thus of a trade liberalization at multilateral, bilateral and regional level. The impacts of this liberalisation of the merchandise trade were deeply felt especially in the sectors of agriculture and textile industry of the area.
The last one is the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA) which was formed in the aftermath of the Barcelona Process (1995) and the Agadir Agreement (2004). It was expected that by 2010 all members of the EU, all Arab nations plus Israel would join to launch a free trade area that would encircle the Mediterranean Sea. The idea was promoted by the EU members mainly for opening new markets and thus increasing the economic output, reducing the oil and the gas dependency of the EU from Russia and for slowing down the increasing rhythm of the EU governments' debt. The date has been rescheduled to the year 2015.
The conclusion from the aforementioned parameters is that in North Africa exist huge opportunities for arm deals, in oil drills and exports, minerals, in the financial and banking areas, in the infrastructure from oil transportations to telecommunications, constructions, the agriculture and the light industry.
Also for political, social and economical reasons many of the European governments and political parties would prefer the problem of illegal migration to be solved in camps somewhere in Sahara. The treaty on friendship and cooperation between Libya and Italy (August 2008) on that subject indicates the trend of the future. (2)
Exactly for these reasons I introduce the term Minor Game (juxtaposed with the Great Game for the Middle East) to describe the antagonisms between governments, lenders and companies for controlling the area. I will also try to examine some of the structural aspects of the North African countries and to show how these influenced the current riots and what can be expected.
Algeria
After the country's independence from France, the National Liberation Front (FLN) took control of the government slipping towards authoritarian practices which were intensified throughout the years. It built strong ties with the army, making the notorious Oudja Clan (which consists of political militants and military leaders formed during the Algerian independence war) the core of political and military decisions. In 1991 during the general elections the Islamists gained power and a civil war followed which pushed them into the South Algeria but up till the present day the army does not fully control the Algerian territory. Another important parameter is that the army is drastically interfering with the political scene up to the point of choosing the current Algerian President, Boudeflica. There has been a state of emergency which prevented the expression of free speech and assembly but in front of fears for major riots that state was lifted in February 2011. In Algeria about 40 political parties exist but no political association may be formed if it is based on differences in religion, language, race, gender or region.
The former Soviet Union and the Russia always remained the major supplier of military aid. In 2007 Algeria bought about $8bn of the Russian weaponry taking France temporarily out of the market, with a deal that also included the deletion of Algerian debts to Russia, provoking a military race with Morocco. (3)
In 2006, Algeria also decided to pay off its full debt of about $8bn to the Paris Club, a group of wealthy creditor nations before schedule benefited from an increase in oil prices. Yet, though the oil is the major product exported from Algeria there is about a 25% of Algerians employed in the agricultural sector. This sector has been negatively influenced by the intra-GAFTA trade and Algeria is importing more than it is exporting in almost all commodities but fuel. (4)
Despite some quarrels between Algeria and Russia about the fighting planes (it is suspected that France in an attempt to shell her own planes provoked it), in 2010 another deal was in progress between the Russian Vimpelcom and the Egyptian Weather Investments for the buying of the Algerian mobile phone company Djezzy. There also has been some pressure from the Russian part and the Gazprom for a close collaboration with the Algerian oil company, Sonatrach (whose activities extend to Tunisia and Libya). Interestingly enough the BP is considering to sell its Algerian assets to BP's Russian joint venture, TNK-BP. (5)
The corruption scandal (2010) that broke out and embraced the Algerian Energy minister, Khelil and the chief executive of the company may have something to do with these pressures.
Up till now the protests are sporadic and aiming at the authoritarian aspect of the Algerian's regime and the increasing rates of poverty. The Islamist presence is uncertain; their influence is greater than the actual forces they can gather in order to raise a civil war.
Egypt
After the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in March 1979, Egypt must be considered as a buffer state of the U.S.A. Since then United States has provided Egypt with an annual average of over $2bn in economic and military assistance since 1979 (of which the $1.3bn a year is the military aid). In 2000, the estimated foreign debt of Egypt was about $30.5 bn. (6)
It is worth mentioning that the personal assets of the former President Hussni (or Hosni) Mubarak and his family are estimated to range between $2bn and $70bn, with the true amount to remain officially unknown. (7)
It doesn't come as a surprise that the U.S actually controls the Egyptian army on all levels of strategic importance. Mubarak assumed the Presidency with the support of the army. In the last years Mubarak's regime was either alarmed by his country's dependency on the United States, or by being used as a covert channel of communication between the U.S and Iran and thus decided in 2007 to start making contacts with the latter, refusing to support any military action against Iran's nuclear program. (8)
The overall imports of Egypt were about $56.2bn in 2009 and its exports were about $29bn for the same year, a 24% and 22% surge from 2008 respectively. Egypt has had a negative balance of trade since the 1980's. The U.S is the largest import partner. It accounts for more than 10% of the total imports, followed by China, Italy, Germany and Saudi Arabia. (9)
Among the major corporations activated in Egypt there are the cement giant Lafarge, Danone, France Telecom, which services 26 million phone subscribers in Egypt, Alstom, Accor Hotel Group and Nissan, to name just a few. They were all promised growth rates to rise to 6% for the fiscal year 2010. (10)
Also, in December 2010, four Israeli companies signed 20 years' contracts for natural gas imports from Egypt of about $10bn.
The intra-GAFTA trade brought only deficits to Egypt's economy, as the balance of imports/exports is negative. More precisely there has been a surplus in agricultural products but the dependency of the country from the Saudi Arabian and Libyan oil erases any possible overall profits. (11)
It can be said that the major export product of Egypt is its working force as millions of Egyptian workers are employed not only in Libya but other Arab Gulf countries as well (the estimations are about 2.7 millions of workers abroad; of whom 1.9 million in the Arab Gulf countries alone). To this must be added that about 5 million are moving internally in order to sustain mainly the agricultural production. (12) If the official counting of the labour force is 17.4 million (1996) then about the 50% of the labour force is in a migration process, internally and abroad.
In a country where the literacy rate is about 57% and about the 18% of Egyptians live on $2 a day or less (and barely keep pace with inflation) it is not strange that Islamist voices do have some appeal. Yet the protesters and other forces managed to marginalise such voices.
The Muslim Brotherhood is a potential threat but in any case it has neither the resources nor the internal coherence or the force to overthrow Egyptian's army leading position in the internal affairs. The American brokered peace treaty with Israel must be considered as unshakable (the same holds for the about 40% natural gas supply of the Israeli demands). More than likely the army shall be established as the regulator and protector of a secular Egyptian state, thus resembling the Turkish state.
Libya
In 2004 after the lift of the United Nations arms embargo the changes were rapid. There has been a race in many areas of economical importance of the country. The same year, Great Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair opened a new period of collaboration with Gaddafi's junta after compensations were given to the victims of Lockerby. In 2007 that led BP (which signed its biggest ever exploration commitment through a bilateral deal, of about $900 million) among many other oil companies to start investing again in Libya. Today there is not only BP which is exploiting Libya's oil resources but also ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, Gazprom and Nippon Oil among others. (13)
From 2005 to 2009, UK has sold arms that worth about 119 million Euros to Libya, being third in the ranking of EU members, behind Italy and France (276 and 210 million Euros respectively). (14)
Even more, in 2004, the French bank BNP bought the 19% of the Sahara Bank marking rapid changes to the banking/financial area in competing with Barclays, HSBC, and J.P. Morgan among others; the competition for the cash surplus of Libya amounts to about $140bn. (15)
In 2008, Gaddafi negotiated with Russia in order for the debts of his country to be erased, to have Russia's military assistance of about $4.5bn value, to open his oil resources to Gazprom, to allow the Russians to construct of a 500km (310-mile) railway line in Libya and to support Russia's plans for a cartel of gas producing nations, similar to OPEC. (16) And though it is not certain about the progress made, about the real amount of the cancelled debt or the one about the arm deals (and it wouldn't be surprising if Gaddafi halted them because he was pushing the Russians for a better deal), the fact remains that Russia started dominating the arm exports in the North Africa once again, having huge advantages over its traditional rivals; USA, Great Britain, France, Italy and China only because the Soviet Union was responsible for about 78% of Libyan arms imports for the period of 1970-1991. (17) Gaddafi's family fortune exceeds the $35bn, which are his personal bank investments alone seized by U.S -$30bn, by U.K - $1bn, by Austria -$1.7bn and Canada -$2.4bn. They have major investments in many parts of the world. The actual amount remains officially unknown. (18)
It wasn't a period of only massive profits for Libya. It also must be stated that from the intra-GAFTA trade, the export/import balance was negative, thus this country had losses of about $975 million only for the year 2005. (19)
The future of the deals made depends heavily on the future of Gaddafi's regime. It is expected that in his fall the American and British companies shall acquire the momentum for the new negotiations to be made. Up till the present, Gaddafi and his tribe seem to dominate the capital, Tripoli, and there isn't anyone who might successfully lead the opposition, seize the power and at the same time would be a reliable negotiator with the markets, to be as once John J. Maresca stated in a Congressional inquiry (1998) "that has the confidence of governments, lenders, and our company" (the company is the UnOCal - United Oil of California, addressing matters regarding Aghanistan). (20)
The worst case scenario will be a civil war between the tribes over the control of Libya with the use of mercenaries from the Sub-Saharan countries. Upon Gaddafi's resigning a transitory form of government shall be formed which will proclaim general elections in due time, with political parties based on the Algerian model after the dismantling and reforming of significant forces of the Libyan army. In case of a military conflict with the Western forces, Libya is considered to be a "soft" opponent, though for many reasons (mainly the anti-American feelings among the Arabs which could escalate the tensions and the conflicts) indirect tactics shall be used for the armament and support of the rebels. The rise of the Islamist movements though it cannot be excluded should be considered as unlikely; the present leaders of the opposition are Gaddafi's ex-ministers and Gaddafi's regime due its very nature was intolerant to any voice which might oppose or question the status quo.
Morocco
After 1956 when Morocco gained its independency from France and Spain, the personal fortune of the Alaouite dynasty which rules the country grew in exponential rates. It led this dynasty to be considered as a multi-national corporation with assets abroad and a leading position in domestic finance, banking and insurance corporations. The fortune of Muhammed VI, the present King of Morocco, was estimated about $500m in 2000 and raised to $2.5bn in ten years. Even after the economical crisis his fortune is estimated about $1.5bn being declined by 25%. (21)
During the same period the growth of the country was increasing with considerably slower rates. The debts are estimated at about $20bn in 2002. Some reasons for the magnification of the structural deficiencies of the country the last 30 years were a. the application of Structural Adjustment Plans in the 1980's, b. the Free Trade Agreement between Morocco and the U.S in 2004, c. the offshoring sector operating from 2006 and on and d. the arms race between Morocco and Algeria and the low tensions between Morocco, Mauritania and the guerrilla movement of Polisario Liberation Front for the control of Western Sahara (that lead Morocco to spend about $2.4bn for the outdated F-16 in 2008).
Morocco is the world's leader in exporting phosphates used mostly as fertilisers (it has about the 75% of the world reserves). Many of these resources lie in the Western Sahara soil which is disputable. The tables for the intra-GAFTA trade show that it has a negative balance due to the country's dependency on petroleum. (22)
It is also a country where the literacy rate is about 53% (23), the percentage of the population below the poverty line (less than $2 per day) is about 14% (2007) The figures about the other Maghreb countries are Algeria - 23% (2006), Egypt - 18.5% (2005), Libya - though not available are estimated at least 30%, Tunisia - at least 2.6% (2005). (24)
About 40% of the population is working in the agricultural sector, 13% in the retail one and 35% in the services. The agreement between Morocco and EU for a free trade area is planned for 2012. It is worth noticing that the influx of European countries in the form of foreign direct investments in Morocco was about 73% of the global amount received in 2007. Other significant parameters are the about 10% (2009) of unemployment and the shortage of medical stuff due to massive immigration. (25)
Morocco has constitutional monarchy with about 30 parties participating in the political scenery. It also has excellent diplomatic relationships with most of the Arab countries and Israel. The latter is a close ally and its secret services saved the Moroccan dynasty by warning them of plots and attempts against the throne repetitively. (26)
The riots questioned the leading position of the Alaouite dynasty and were provoked due to the gradual impoverishment of the urban suburbs among all the other reasons. (27) In case of emergency it is expected that the throne will proclaim general elections and direct some funding to the poorest areas and classes.
Tunisia
From 1956, the year that Tunisia earned its independence from France up till the riots of 2011 only two persons were Presidents of this country. The first, Habib Bourguiba, established a strict one-party state and ruled for 31 years till 1987 when Zine el Abidine Ben Ali with a bloodless coup d'etat overthrew him. And though he established a multi-party system, the ruling party RCD is repressive and one of the most authoritarian in the world.
In the economical front, there has been an increasing flow of foreign direct investment in Tunisia due to the simplification of the administrative procedures, the reduced taxations and its proximity to Euro-Mediterranean and other Arab markets. Privatisations and further liberalisation of the Tunisian economy were the economical trends from 1987 and on. Around 160 enterprises were privatized since 1987 when the privatisation program started and at present times around 2700 enterprises with foreign participation are implanted, occupying about the 1/6 of total employment (28) (the total labour force is estimated about 3.6 million). In 2000 all tariff barriers were lifted between the Tunisian part and the EU (about 75% of Tunisia's exports are heading to EU and the 72% of its imports are from EU accordingly). In order to replace lost customs revenue the government raised the taxes and tried to reform the tax collection system. Tunisia entered the free trade area in 2008 with EU. In a country where the official unemployment levels are about 13%, with gross debt of about $20bn and an estimated 55% of population under 25 years old it was expected that the inequalities would magnify. The south and west departments of the country are impoverished partially due to the fact that the total export/import balance is negative (about $15bn and $18bn respectively). Also the intra-Gafta tables show Tunisia had a surplus (about $600m), as it massively exports agricultural products, chemicals and manufactured products yet it is heavily dependent on oil imports. (29)
The arm deals also flourished in the last 30 years. In 1988, the first year of Ben Ali's regime the military aid received was about $353m, increasing every year and in 2009 it was about $541m (30)
Ben Ali and his family (especially from the part of his wife, Leila Trabelsi) managed over the years to control the 30%-40% of the Tunisian economy through the placement of assets in banks, finance, insurance, transportation, tourism and property sectors among others. It is estimated that they accumulated wealth of about $10bn. (31)
The riots have overthrown Ben Ali's government and some form of democratic process like free elections is expected to take place.
*******
In this article I've tried to present some aspects of the structural problems that are present in the Maghreb countries. And though no one can safely predict the future the riots will turn to be a struggle for controlling the periphery of Europe.
On the micro- level it was the economical and social anomalies, some started in the period of colonialism, some others during the Cold War and the free-market economical models of the 80's that played the major role in the uprisings that shattered the North African regimes. There has been a continuous intervention in their domestic affairs on all major parameters, political, social, economical, diplomatic and military. These anomalies made these countries so appealing to the foreign and domestic capital which in their own turn magnified them. And the reality is that though the secularity of the movements is unquestionable they put at stake major economic and diplomatic agreements.
On the meso-level, some of the grant players of the market will grasp the opportunity and will want to destabilise the dominant role of France in the trade with the Maghreb countries (estimated about 28bn Euros in 2008), and to minimise the Russian arm trade and the dependency of Europe from the Russian oil and gas. Other reasons are the dismantling (if possible) or controlling the OPEC, in terms of oil production, exports and prices, the opening, the control, the securing and the expansion of the market for the American and European products for the North-South Line (sometimes referred to as Brandt Line). Africa is also appealing for another reason. African oil producers are open to foreign investment in exploration and production at times when about the two thirds of global oil reserves is closed to foreign equity investment and major reserve holders such as Russia are limiting the opportunities for foreign investors. Based on all this, Libya should be considered as the great prize in North Africa.
On the macro-level the problem is different and appears to have two limitations. The first is how to ensure the dominant role of the U.S on all levels whilst the oil resources have already reached or they are about to reach their peak - due to depletion of resources- in America, Russia, Mexico, Indonesia, Argentina, EU (notably Britain and Norway) and in Saudi Arabia. North Africa (as well Iraq, Iran, Venezuela and the Caspian Sea) still have unexplored oil resources. (32)
There exists another limitation; exactly because the empire-model of controlling any vast area is unsustainable even in the form of vassal states, (partly due to huge costs that this kind of control acquires, the opportunistic action of counter-elites, and the decline of the U.S status on many levels -military and economically mainly- from the throne of the de facto unquestioned global superpower) a democratic-humanistic facet has to be invented in order to gain the support from the public opinion of the West. Two reasons are predominant. The multi-cultural approach is another direct attack on the supremacy of the U.S in terms of culture. The second is that the public opinion of the West went through tremendous changes during the last 50 years unwilling to support foreign military actions and engagements for a long period of time. On that, one can surely assume that the human rights movement (even unwillingly) actually fuels the foreign interventions both in military and financial terms.
And the reality is that in the geostrategic affairs, especially in the kind of games as described, there can never be a lose-it-all situation. Only those who believe that the North Africa will turn to be an al-Qaeda department or a member of the "Iran Inc" will be gravely disappointed in the long-run. (33) In between one can trade these fears with more military, diplomatic and economical aid when asked for.
Footnotes
1. Mohamed Hedi Bchir, Hakim Ben Hammouda, Nassim Oulmane and Mustapha Sadni Jallab - "The cost of non-Maghreb:Achieving the Gains from Economic Integration." United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Nov 2006, page 5 http://www.uneca.org/atpc/Work%20in%20progress/44.pdf
2. Natalino Ronzitti, "The Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya: New Prospects for Cooperation in the Mediterranean?" - Istituto Affari Internazionali, Paper presented at the Mediterranean Strategy Group Conference on "Is regional cooperation in the Maghreb possible? Implications for the Region and External Actors", in cooperation with German Marshall Fund of the United States Genoa, 11-12 May 2009 http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iai0909.pdf
3. "Algeria in Russian Weapons Deal"- BBC News, 11 March 2006 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4796382.stm
4. Javad Abedini, Nicolas Peridy, "The Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA): An Estimation of Free Trade Effects (Preliminary Version)", Journal of Economic Integration, 23(4): 848-872, 2008. Tables 2 and 3. Alternatively it can be found at http://economics.ca/2007/papers/0300.pdf
5. "Russia pursues new Algeria deals with Medvedev visit" - BBC News, 06 October 2010 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11484201
6. Jeremy M. Sharp, "Egypt -United States Relations", CRS Issue Brief for Congress, June 2005 http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/ib93087.pdf
7. "Switzerland Freezes All Assets Tied To Mubarak", CBS News, 11 February 2011 http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/02/11/501364/main20031542.shtml and Philip Inman -"Mubarak family fortune could reach $70bn, say experts" The Guardian, 04 February 2011 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/04/hosni-mubarak-family-fortune
8. "Leaked Diplomatic Cables show Tensions between US, Egypt on democracy, human rights questions", The Guardian (of Canada), 28 January 2011 http://www.theguardian.pe.ca/Canada---World/Society/2011-01-28/article-2181368/Leaked-diplomatic-cables-show-tensions-between-US,-Egypt-on-democracy,-human-rights-questions/1 also Shlomo Shamir, "U.S. and Iran trying to set up covert diplomatic channel" - Haaretz, 22 September 2010 http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/u-s-and-iran-trying-to-set-up-covert-diplomatic-channel-1.315253 and Andrew Miller "Egypt and Iran ally against U.S. Military Action" - The Trumpet, 24 September 2007 http://www.thetrumpet.com/?q=4286.2523.0.0
9. Economy Watch http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/egypt/export-import.html
10. D-8 Organisation for Economic Cooperation http://www.developing8.org/2010/02/06/egypt-2010-and-2011-will-bring-economic-growth
11. Javad Abedini, Nicolas Peridy, "The Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA): An Estimation of Free Trade Effects (Preliminary Version)", Journal of Economic Integration, 23(4): 848-872, 2008. Tables 2 and 3. Alternatively it can be found at http://economics.ca/2007/papers/0300.pdf
12. Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation & Poverty http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/regions/egypt_themiddleeast.html
13. "Big Foreign Companies doing Business with Libya" - Reuters, 20 August 2009 http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/20/us-libya-oil-sb-idUSTRE57J3K720090820
14. "EU arms exports to Libya: Who armed Gaddafi?"- The Guardian, 2 March 2011 http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/mar/01/eu-arms-exports-libya
15. "Big Foreign Companies doing Business with Libya" - Reuters, 20 August 2009 http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/20/us-libya-oil-sb-idUSTRE57J3K720090820?pageNumber=2 and Vivienne Walt "After 37 years, the U.S. arrives to Do Business in Libya"- Time, 22 February 2010 http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1967079,00.html
16. "Russia swaps Libya debt for deals"- BBC News, 18 April 2008 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7353997.stm
17. Dr. Paul Holtom, "Russian arms transfers to North Africa: Fuelling an arms race?"- RIA Novosti, 15 March 2010 http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20100315/158200374.html - SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2010, http://milexdata.sipri.org - SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
18. "The Dictator's dough: Astonishing wealth of Gaddafi and his family revealed"- Daily Mail, 2 March 2011 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1361919/Muammar-Gaddafi-familys-astonishing-wealth-revealed.html
19. Javad Abedini, Nicolas Peridy, "The Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA): An Estimation of Free Trade Effects (Preliminary Version)", Journal of Economic Integration, 23(4): 848-872, 2008. Table 1. Alternatively it can be found at http://economics.ca/2007/papers/0300.pdf
20. "U.S. Interests In The Central Asian Republics. Hearing Before The Subcommittee On Asia And The Pacific Of The Committee On International Relations. House Of Representatives", 48-119 CC 1998, 12 February 1998 http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa48119.000/hfa48119_0f.htm
For example in Afghanistan, its President Hamid Karzai had been a UnOCal consultant. The company's vice president, John J. Maresca was the first U.S ambassador to Karzai's administration and the next one, Zalmay Khalilzad, had been a UnOCal consultant as well. 21. "Thai King Tops List of World's Richest Royals With $35b" - Fox News, 22 August 2008 http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,408645,00.html
22. Javad Abedini, Nicolas Peridy, "The Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA): An Estimation of Free Trade Effects (Preliminary Version)", Journal of Economic Integration, 23(4): 848-872, 2008. Table 2 and 3. Alternatively it can be found at http://economics.ca/2007/papers/0300.pdf
23. Central Intelligence Agency - The World Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2103.html
24. The World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.2DAY and Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2046.html
25. Dr. Hassan Semlali, "Morocco Case Study: Health Care Environments in Morocco - Positive Practice Environments in Morocco" - Global Health Workforce Alliance, 2010 http://www.who.int/workforcealliance/knowledge/PPEMorocco.pdf
26. Marc Pelerman, "An Arab King Righteous Among the Nations?" - The Jewish Daily Forward, 14 December 2010 http://www.forward.com/articles/12256
27. Giles Tremlett, "Morocco riots leave five dead"- The Guardian, 21February 2011 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/21/morocco-riots-five-dead
28. Privatization in Tunisia - Republic of Tunisia http://www.privatisation.gov.tn/www/en/directdoc.asp?docid=197
29. Javad Abedini, Nicolas Peridy, "The Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA): An Estimation of Free Trade Effects (Preliminary Version)", Journal of Economic Integration, 23(4): 848-872, 2008. Table 2 and 3. Alternatively it can be found at http://economics.ca/2007/papers/0300.pdf
30. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2010, http://milexdata.sipri.org - SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers ($ in constant 2009 prices)
31. Aidan Lewis, "Tracking down the Ben Ali and Trabelsi fortune" - BBC News, 31 January 2011 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12302659
32. Alfred Cavallo, "OPEC, peak oil and the end of cheap gas" - Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July 2008 http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/opec-peak-oil-and-the-end-of-cheap-gas
33. David E. Sanger, James Glanz and Jo Becker, "Around the World, Distress Over Iran" - The New York Times, 28 November 2010 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/middleeast/29iran.html
From all the other countries that riots have occurred, Yemen, Oman, Jordan, Bahrain and Djibouti or there exists a possibility of rioting like in Saudi Arabia (extremely unlikely at least in a mass scale) and Syria only in the case of Yemen can the support of al-Qaeda be seriously discussed Yet other parameters should be taken into consideration like:
a. The civil wars of 1969-1978 (when the Communists gained power), of 1991-1994 (due to economic conditions, inflation, and price rising of basic goods), the disputes with Eritrea in territorial and maritime territories (and in a mainly agricultural economy this has serious consequences) and of 2004-present between Yemeni forces and Shiite Houthi rebels.
b. The fact that Yemen's president Ali Abdullah Salleh rules authoritatively for about 30 years
c. the role and influence of the Saudi Arabia over Yemen's domestic affairs and the tribes of Yemen, started from the 1970's when they supported the Royalists in their fight against the Communists of South Yemen,
d. Yemen is from 1997 on under the supervision and the aid of the IMF which forced the government to implement the recommended reforms and from 2002 under the World Bank's support package. There have been massive capital allocations (about $5.3bn) when Yemen failed to reform its economy as requested.
e. The American forces are aiding Yemeni army and their relationships and collaborations are excellent.
f. Yemen is one of the poorest countries of the world with 45% of its population living in poverty (the GDP per capita in 2010 was estimated about $1270), and literacy rate of 54% (population 25millions).
The tensions in Yemen's soil will continue for years. Some democratic reforms will be realised. At the present the strategic areas of the country are under control and will continue to be so.
Library of Congress-Federal Research Division http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Yemen.pdf also International Monetary Fund (IMF), April 2010 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2007&ey=2010&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=474&s=NGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC%2CLP&grp=0&a=&pr.x=38&pr.y=3 and Damien McElroy "US special forces train Yemen army as Arab state becomes al-Qaeda 'reserve base'" - The Telegraph, 13 December 2009 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/6803120/US-special-forces-train-Yemen-army-as-Arab-state-becomes-al-Qaeda-reserve-base.html
As far as the "Iran Inc", the hypothesis can be supported in the case of Bahrain with some certainty. Bahrain is basing its profits on the banking and finance sector. From the 2005 and on Bahrain has signed a U.S. free trade agreement and followed a massive privatisation programme. The economical crisis has increased the poverty especially among the Shiites which are the poorer class. Yet it should be emphasised that the riots in their beginning had as an indirect target the King of Bahrain, Hamad ibn Isa Al Khalifa and as a direct one the Prime Minister Khalifa ibn Salman al Khalifa. In a political manoeuvre in order to save his throne, he exploited old religious/political tensions and the riots suddenly became a religious conflict between the Shiites and the Sunnites (the al Khalibi family is Sunni Muslims. The Sunni are about the 30% of the population. The expertise that such manoeuvre requires was gained prior to the period of the Bandargate scandal in 2006). Notably the other measures the throne took to maintain its leading position were the suggestion of a $2600 per family and the march of the Saudi Arabian forces towards Bahrain in order to pacify the protesters. Pressured from the U.S. and the foreign investors it is almost certain that the King will give in to some of the demands of the protesters.
Amir Taheri, "Why Bahrain blew up"- New York Post, 17 February 2011 http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/why_bahrain_blew_up_NkYx4h4E1m80WGe2tXfsrI
"Saudi Arabia sends tanks to riot-hit Bahrain-paper"- RIA Novosti, 01 March 2011 http://en.rian.ru/world/20110301/162803894.html
Ghanem Nuseibeh, "Riots in Bahrain spread as government restricts internet", Risk and Forecast, Political Capital Policy Research & Consulting Institute, 16 February 2011 http://www.riskandforecast.com/post/energy/riots-in-bahrain-spread-as-government-restricts-internet_655.html
Hassan M.Fattah "Report cites bid by Sunnis in Bahrain to rig elections-Africa &Middle East - International Herald Tribune" - The New York Times, 2 October 2006 http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/02/world/africa/02iht-web.1002bahrain.2997505.html?_r=1
Published in the Glasgow Review
http://www.glasgowreview.co.uk/
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